Solid, neat tight: toward charting the boundary of definability

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Bard College at Simon's Rock

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Categoricity in second-order and first-order logic

Second-order logic allows quantifiers over subsets of the domain, not just elements.

- (Dedekind) ω is the unique model of Peano arithmetic, formulated in second-order logic.
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Suppose $\mathcal{M} \models \mathsf{PA}^2$. We build an isomorphism $\omega \cong \mathcal{M}$: Map 0 to $0^{\mathcal{M}}$ and recursively map n + 1 to the successor of where you mapped n. By induction in \mathcal{M} the range of this embedding must be all of \mathcal{M} .

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First-order logic only allows quantifiers over elements. It cannot have such absolute categoricity results.

- (Löwenheim-Skolem) If a theory T has an infinite model then T has a model of every infinite cardinality ≥ |T|.
- Trying to run Dedekind's construction for *M* ⊨ PA only gives that *ω* → *M* embeds as an initial segment.

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Fact

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This remains true if you extend PA to a completion.

If something is impossible, as mathematicians we want to see how close we can get.

Question

Can we find categoricity-like properties which are enjoyed by the first-order logic formulations of important foundational theories like PA or ZF?

"Every model of arithmetic which ω can see is isomorphic to it."

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To say what this means we need the notion of an interpretation.

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- $\mathsf{RCA}_0 \trianglerighteq \mathsf{I}\Sigma_1$ but $\mathsf{I}\Sigma_1 \nvDash \mathsf{RCA}_0$

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- $\mathsf{RCA}_0 \trianglerighteq \mathsf{I}\Sigma_1$ but $\mathsf{I}\Sigma_1 \not\bowtie \mathsf{RCA}_0$

Fact: Doing $ZFC^{\neg\infty} \supseteq PA$ then $PA \supseteq ZFC^{\neg\infty}$ or vice versa gives an isomorphism. But that's not true for doing $ZF \supseteq ZFC + V = L$ then $ZFC + V = L \supseteq ZF$.

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
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- ZFC + V = L is a retract of ZF.
- But ZF and ZFC + V = L are not bi-interpretable (Enayat).

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But we avoid loops:

If ω ⊵_{par} N ⊵_{par} ω then N ≅ ω.
 (Because a model of arithmetic cannot interpret a shorter model.)

Solidity

A theory $\ensuremath{\mathcal{T}}$ is solid if

- For all models $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^*, \mathcal{N}$ of \mathcal{T} if
 - $\mathcal{M} \trianglerighteq_{\mathsf{par}} \mathcal{N} \trianglerighteq_{\mathsf{par}} \mathcal{M}^*$ and
 - There is a parametrically definable isomorphism $\mathcal{M}\cong \mathcal{M}^*,$

Then there is a parametrically definable isomorphism $\mathcal{M}\cong\mathcal{N}.$

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Example:

• (Visser) PA is solid.

Because the " $\omega \succeq \mathcal{N} \trianglerighteq \omega$ implies $\mathcal{N} \cong \omega$ " argument can be made to work over any $\mathcal{M} \models \mathsf{PA}$.

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$$\mathcal{M} \xrightarrow{} \mathcal{N} \xrightarrow{} \mathcal{M}^* \implies \mathcal{M} \cong \mathcal{N}$$

Theorem (Visser)

PA is solid: for $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}^*, \mathcal{N} \models \mathsf{PA}$ if

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Lemma: If $\mathcal{M} \trianglerighteq_{par} \mathcal{N}$ are models of PA then \mathcal{M} embeds as an initial segment of \mathcal{N} .

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Proof Sketch: Suppose $i : \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{N}$ and $j : \mathcal{N} \to \mathcal{M}^*$ are definable initial embeddings and $\mathcal{M} \cong_{par} \mathcal{M}^*$.

- Claim: *i* and *j* are both surjective.
 - Else, k = j ∘ i : M → M^{*} embeds M onto a strict initial segment of M^{*}.
 - But composing k with the isomorphism $\mathcal{M}^* \cong \mathcal{M}$ gives a definable cut in \mathcal{M} .
 - This is impossible, since in PA any bounded definable set has a maximum.
- So *i* is the desired isomorphism.

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T is tight if

- Given two extensions *U*, *V* of *T*, if *U* and *V* are bi-interpretable then *U* = *V*.
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- But the converses do not hold.

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- But the converses do not hold.
- All of these properties are preserved by bi-interpretations.
- All of these properties are preserved by adding axioms (in the same language).
- These properties are really only interesting for sequential theories—those which are subject to the first incompleteness theorem.
- A complete theory such as ACF₀ is trivially neat.

Theorem

The following theories are all solid, and hence also neat and tight.

- (Visser) PA
- (Enayat) ZF
- (Enayat) Z₂, second-order arithmetic with full comprehension
- (Enayat) KM, class theory with full comprehension

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Question (Enayat): Do we need the full strength of these theories to get these quasi-categoricity properties?

Recent work (Piotr Gruza, Leszek Kołodziejczyk, and Mateusz Lełyk): No. There are theories intermediate between $I\Sigma_k$ and PA which are solid.

Theorem

None of the following are tight, and hence are neither neat nor solid.

- (Freire–Hamkins) Zermelo set theory
- (Freire-Hamkins) ZF⁻, set theory without Powerset
- (Enayat) Finite subtheories of PA, ZF, Z₂, or KM
- (Freire–W.) ACA and Π¹_k-CA, i.e. with full induction but only bounded comprehension, and the analogous subtheories of KM

These results suggest that tightness characterizes the important foundational theories like PA and ZF.

Julia Kameryn Williams (BCSR)

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Theorem

ACA is not tight: there are distinct but bi-interpretable extensions of ACA.

- ACA is the subsystem of second-order arithmetic whose primary axioms are arithmetical comprehension and full induction.
- Any ω -model of ACA₀ is a model of ACA.

• (Tarski) $0^{(\omega)}$ is not arithmetical.

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Image: A matrix

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- (Mostowski) But it is definable over the arithmetical sets.

- For each k ∈ ω, the k-th jump 0^(k) is arithmetical.
- So we can define 0^(ω) by identifying which sets are the 0^(k) then gluing them together.
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- We just saw a Σ_1^1 definition. There's also a Π_1^1 definition.

- We can add a new real by finite approximations.
- C is the poset consisting of finite partial functions ω → 2, ordered by extension.
- A real c ⊆ ω is generic over a Turing ideal X if it get below every dense set in X.
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- Since 0^(ω) is Δ¹₁-definable over any ω-model of ACA we get that any ω-model of ACA can define a generic over the arithmetical sets.
- Indeed, they can all define the same generic, call it c.

Key point: From $0^{(\omega)}$ you can extract a canonical enumeration of the arithmetical sets, and you use that enumeration to construct \mathfrak{c} .

Two structures:

 (ω, \mathcal{A}) and $(\omega, \mathcal{A}[\mathfrak{c}])$

 ${\mathcal A}$ is the arithmetical sets.

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- ACA has full induction, which makes the arguments about defining 0^(ω) and c work, even over an ω-nonstandard model.
- The definitions are sufficiently absolute to enable a bi-interpretation:
 - ACA + "I am the arithmetical sets" and
 - ACA + "I am the sets arithmetical in \mathfrak{c} ".

Thus, ACA is not tight.

Abstractly, these are the ingredients we need:

- A canonical structure;
- How to extend this structure;
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For ACA:

- The arithmetical sets;
- Cohen forcing;
- The absoluteness of $0^{(\omega)}$;
- Given by the induction schema.

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Can be done for Π^1_k -CA:

- The minimum β -model of Π_k^1 -CA;
- Cohen forcing;
- The absoluteness of L;
- A little fine structure theory.

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For class theories $T \subseteq KM$:

- Minimum models again;
- Cohen forcing again;
- L again;
- Fine structure theory again.

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Other uses?

- Maybe only need the first three?
- Or just two of them?

A theory T of arithmetic is tight if and only if $T \supseteq PA$. And similarly for ZF and other important foundational theories.

While we now know the general conjecture to be false (Gruza, Kołodziejczyk, and Łełyk), many natural fragments of PA, etc. fail to be tight.

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What makes the construction for the non-tightness of ACA work was:

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A moral: These categoricity-like properties are characterizing semantic closure—the limits of definability.

Some open questions

- Is there a finitely axiomatizable sequential tight theory? (Enayat) No for subtheories of PA and ZF.
- Is PA⁻ + Collection tight? (Enayat-Łełyk) It is not solid.
- Is there an extension of KP which is solid?
- Can we better understand the separation between solidity, neatness, and tightness?
 - Recent work (Piotr Gruza, Leszek Kołodziejczyk, and Mateusz Łełyk): There are theories intermediate between $I\Sigma_n$ and PA which are neat but not tight.

Thank you!

Julia Kameryn Williams (BCSR)

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